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Board of Governors,  Federal Reserve Systemt 
This paper uses an infinite-horizon  model  based on individual  max- 
imizing  behavior  to  study  whether  explosive  price-level  paths  un- 
related  to  monetary  growth-speculative  hyperinflations-can  be 
equilibrium  paths under  rational expectations.  In a pure fiat money 
regime,  speculative  hyperinflations  can  be excluded  only  through 
severe  restrictions  on  individual  preferences;  but when  the  govern- 
ment fractionally backs the currency by guaranteeing  a minimal real 
redemption  value for money,  speculative  hyperinflations  are impos- 
sible, even  if agents  are not completely  certain that they can redeem 
their  money  in  any  given  period.  The  analysis  also  confirms  that 
implosive  price-level  paths  and  divergent  paths  for  capital  asset 
prices are not equilibria  under  either  monetary  regime. 
Knife-edge  stability  is a common  property  of  dynamic  monetary  mod- 
els  assuming  perfect  foresight  or  rational  expectations.  Because  ex- 
pectations  are  self-fulfilling  in  these  models,  unstable  price  paths  are 
fueled  in part  by speculative  anticipations  unrelated  to market  funda- 
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mentals,  and for this reason,  the unique  convergent  path (the saddle 
path) is generally  assumed  to be the equilibrium  path of  the system. 
But while this empirically  plausible assumption  yields sensible results, 
the  aggregative  models  in which  it is applied  are typically not  suffi- 
ciently detailed  to allow one to prove that the saddle path is the unique 
equilibrium  path.  Brock  (1974,  1975)  advanced  a monetary  model 
based on a complete  specification  of infinitely  lived individuals'  pref- 
erences  and showed  how speculative  hyperinflations  and hyperdefla- 
tions might be ruled out. His model and conclusions  have provided  an 
important justification  for  the  use  of  the  saddle-path  assumption  in 
other  macro  models  with rational expectations.' 
This  paper  reexamines  those  conclusions  in a similar  maximizing 
model  incorporating  productive  capital  as well  as money.  Under  a 
pure  fiat monetary  system,  speculative  hyperinflationary  price-leVel 
paths cannot  be ruled  out as equilibria unless a somewhat  unintuitive 
restriction is imposed  on agents' utility functions.  An identical restric- 
tion  is  needed  to  eliminate  hyperinflations  in  Brock's  (1974,  1975) 
model,  and  a  similar  one  is  needed  in  other  models  of  pure  fiat 
money.  2  We argue  that this restriction  is economically  unreasonable 
and show it implies that agents would have infinitely negative  utility if 
they held  zero  real balances. 
Speculative  paths  can  be  eliminated  without  such  restrictions  on 
preferences  provided  the government  fractionally backs the currency 
by standing  ready to redeem  each dollar for a small amount of capital. 
Agents  need  not  have  complete  faith  in  the  government's  promise; 
even  a small probability that the government  will redeem  dollars for 
capital turns  out  to be  sufficient  to preclude  speculative  hyperinfla- 
tions. 
l See, e.g.,  Lucas (1975),  Kouri (1976),  and Fischer (1979).  Flood and (arber  (1980) 
have  attempted  to  provide  further  justification  for  the  saddle-path  assumption  by 
testing  it empirically  on data from  the German  hyperinflation-. 
' Brock (1978)  demonstrates  that this restriction is needed  to preclude  explosive  (but 
not implosive)  price  paths in a continuous-time  version  of  his discrete-time  model.  In 
this paper we show that the restriction is needed  in the discrete-time  case as well. Brock 
and  Scheinkman  (1980)  prove  that  a  similar  condition  eliminates  hyperinflationary 
equilibria  in  certain  overlapping-generations  models  of  fiat  money.  Scheinkman  (1980) 
does  the  same in a variant of  the  Clower  (1967)  cash-in-advance  model,  as does  Gray 
(1982)  in a model  where  money  is assumed  to reduce  transaction  costs. 
3 Brock (1982b)  shows that the  government  can prevent  speculative  hyperinflations 
by introducing  an arbitrarily small tax-financed  real subsidy  proportional  to nominal 
money  holdings.  He first conjectured  the result  that even a small probability of govern- 
ment intervention  eliminates  speculative  paths. Wallace (1 98 1), in a nonstochastic  over- 
lapping-generations  model,  advances  a government  intervention  scheme  similar to the 
one  studied  in this paper; but in his setup  money  is backed by the perishable consunmp- 
tion good  rather than  by a durable  asset. SPECULATIVE  HYPERINFLATIONS  677 
I.  The  Model 
In this section we study the pricing of pure fiat money and productive 
capital  in  an  economy  of  infinitely  lived,  utility-maximizing  agents 
with perfect  foresight.  As in Brock (1974,  1975), a demand  for money 
arises through  the  assumption  that an agent's  direct  utility depends 
on  his stock of  real balances  as well as his consumption  level.l 
Each of the identical agents lives forever and maximizes  the present 
discounted  value of  his utility stream, 
FIG 
W =  1  tIu(c1) +  v(mt)],  1  <  1,  (1) 
t = 
where  c, denotes  consumption  and  m, is the  ratio of  nominal  money 
holdings  M, to  the  price  level  P,.  The  functions  u()  and  zv(  ) are in- 
creasing  in  their  respective  arguments,  strictly  concave,  differen- 
tiable on the open  interval (0, x),  and they obey the Inada conditions: 
limos  u'(c)  =  Xc lim(.  u'(c)  =  0, lim"()Z v'(m)  =  x,  limi  V'  (m) =  0. 
Individuals  may  hold  two assets,  fiat money  and  nondepreciating 
capital. A unit of capital yields a fixed physical return of r units of the 
perishable  consumption  good  at the end  of  each  period.  At the be- 
ginning  of each period,  a typical agent receives from the government 
a transfer  of h, units of  the consumption  good.  The  individual's  flow 
budget  constraint  is therefore 
A,-  A,  =  Prk,-I  +  (Qt -  Qi,)k,-I  +  Pht  -  Ptt.  (2) 
In (2), At denotes  nominal  assets in period t; k, denotes  physical capital 
holdings;  Q,  is the  money  price of  capital; and M(  and k0 are given. 
The  wealth constraint  is 
At =  M,  +  Qtk,.  (3) 
4 The  model of this section is a discrete-time  version of the model in Obstfeld  (1982). 
Like Brock, we focus  on the case of a separable  utility function.  If instead  real money 
balances  and  the  consumption  good  are substitutes,  there  may be multiple  convergent 
equilibria, even  if both goods  are everywhere  normal (see Obstfeld  1982). The  present 
paper  ignores  the  possibility  that there  may exist  more  than  one  convergent  equilib- 
rium path. It is concerned  only with the possibility that an economy  possessing  a single 
convergent  equilibrium  path  may  also  possess  divergent  equilibrium  paths.  (Calvo 
(1978X 1979)  and  Taylor  (1977),  the  latter  in the  context  of  a descriptive  model.  de- 
scribe economies  with multiple  convergent  rational expectations  equilibria. 
5 A  unit of  capital  may thus  be thought  of  as a Lucas (1978)  "tree" with a nonsto- 
chastic yield. 678  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
The  necessary  first-order  (Euler)  conditions  for  the  individual's 
problem  areas 
U' (C,)/P,  =  [E' (MI/P,)/P]  +  [mu'  (c,  + Ol)Pt  + I],  (4) 
Oct)  qt  =  P3u'(c+  i)(q  + I  +  r),  (5) 
where  q,-QI/P,  is the  real price of  capital. Condition  (4) states that 
along an optimal  path, the utility cost of obtaining  $1.00  at time t must 
equal the  utility gain  from  holding  that dollar  for a period  and con- 
verting it back into consumption  at time t +  1. Similarly, condition  (5) 
states  that  the  individual  cannot  gain  from  buying  an extra  unit  of 
capital at time t and converting  it back into consumption  at time t +  1. 
Markets clear at the beginning  of each  period.  The  total supply  of 
capital in the economy,  k, is fixed  and is divided  between  the portion 
held by the government,  k,  and the portion held by the public, k -k. 
There  is no government  consumption,  and the money  supply  is con- 
stant at level M. The  earnings  rkg  on  the  government's  capital hold- 
ings are fully rebated  to the  public in the  form  of  the transfers ht. 
In equilibrium,  the private demand  for consumption  during  period 
t, ct, must  equal  the  economy's  output  y =rk.  Furthermore,  the  de- 
mand for nominal  balances, Mt, must equal the supply M for all t. By 
combining  the  market-clearing  conditions  with  the  necessary  Euler 
conditions  (4) and  (5), we obtain two first-order  difference  equations 
in ,m and  q: 
u'(y)mt?+ =  mA[u'(y)  -  v (mM)],  (6) 
q1  =  (qui/z)  -  r.  (7) 
Note  that equation  (6) is identical  to the equation  describing  the dy- 
namics  of  Brock's  (1974,  1975)  monetary  model.  The  dynamics  of 
real money  balances m and the real price of capital q are independent 
here  for  two reasons.  First, the  capital stock is given  and  cannot  be 
augmented  through  saving. Second,  the instantaneous  utility function 
is separable. 
While there  are many Euler paths for m and q-paths  which satisfy 
(6) and (7)-not  all are equilibrium  paths. We now discuss conditions 
under  which all but one  of  these  "candidate" equilibria can be ruled 
out. 
h The  first-order  conditions  (4) and (5) are obtained  by maximizing  the Lagrangian 
> f3'{[u(c,)  +  zv(M,/P,)] +  -y,(A, -  M,  -  Qk,) 
t = 0) 
-  X,[A, -  At  -  (Ptr  +  Q.  -  Q,_  )ktI  -  Ph,  +  Pct]} 
with respect to c,, A,, M,, and k, and then eliminating  the multipliers A,,  X,+  , and  y, from 
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II.  The  Transversality  and  Infeasibility  Conditions 
This section begins by showing  that the unique  path for the real price 
of capital consistent  with economy-wide  equilibrium  is the steady-state 
path,  qt q  3=  r/(I  -  3)  for  all t. A  condition  on  agents'  utility 
functions  under  which  all but a single,  constant,  nominal  price-level 
path can be ruled  out  is then  established  and interpreted. 
To  rule out  paths for q originating  below q, rewrite the Euler-path 
equation  (7) in the  form 
qt+  -  I  =  (l/P)(qt  -  #)  (8) 
and observe that if qO  < #, qt  must become  negative  in finite time. Such 
implosive  q paths are infeasible  under  the assumption  that agents can 
freely  dispose  of  both  capital  and  money.  Explosive  q paths-those 
originating  above q  -can  be excluded  by the following  transversality 
argument.  Applying  successive  substitutions  to  (5), one  obtains  the 
necessary  condition 
T 
U (c,)qt=  >  EWu'(c,+f)r  +  p  Tu (ct+T)qt+  T.  (9) 
.S= I 
Equation (9) implies that, along an optimal  path, the utility gain fromt 
converting  a unit of capital into consumption  at tim-e  t and repurchas- 
ing the capital at time t +  T must equal the utility value of the interest 
earnings  forgone  in the interim.  But it is also necessary for optilnality 
that the utility gain from consuming  a unit of'capital at time t, u'(,)q,, 
not  exceed  the  utility  value  of' the  interest  earnings  forgone  if' the 
capital is never repurchased,  X,  I Pu'(,?,)r.  As (9) shows,  the latter 
condition  can hold  only  if' lim  per3Tu((  ,+T)q,+T  =  0. When  q origi- 
nates above q, the foregoing  limit is, by (8), strictly positive. Faced with 
a q path  that violates  the  transversality  condition  in this manner,  all 
individuals  would  wish to reduce  their capital holdings  permanently. 
Since  this is not  possible  in the  aggregate,  explosive  q paths  are not 
equilibrium  paths. Thus  q, =  q  for all t is necessary  for equilibriumn.8 
Having established  that divergent  speculative  paths cannot arise on 
the nonmonetary  side of' our  model,  we now study conditions  under 
7 The  intuitive  interpretation  of  the transversality condition  presented  below draws 
heavily on Gray (1982).  The  necessity  of  transversality conditions  is discussed  by Ben- 
veniste  and  Scheinkman  (1982)  and by Weitzman  (1973).  Brock (1982a)  applies  their 
results in a stochastic model  of  real capital asset pricing. 
8 Strictly speaking,  the transversality condition  for the individual's problem  is limi.-, 
73uI(ct+T)qf+Tkt+T  =  0 if the individual  can reduce  his capital holdings  to zero but not 
below  zero  (see  Gray and  Salant  1981).  Because  we have  assumed  here  that all indi- 
viduals  are  identical,  however,  each  individual  will  hold  the  same  positive  quantity 
of  capital along  an equilibrium  path  for the economy. 68o  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
A(m),  B(m)  A(m) 
B(m) 
/~~~~~ 
FIG.  1.  tll,,SI}(T)>  () 
which  the  path  of  the  price  level  is  unique.  For  this  purpose  it  is 
convenient  to  employ  the  diagrammatic  technique  introduced  by 
Brock  (1974,  1975).  Define  A(m)  m[u'(y)  -  v'(m)]  and  B(m)  = 
Pu'(N),m. Euler-path  equation  (6)  may  then  be  written  A(m,)  = 
B(m,?  ). As shown  in figures  1 and  2, the B(m) schedule  is a straight 
line of slope Pu'(T) emanating  from the origin. By the Inada condition 
limiT0  i1'(i1)  -  ,  the  A(m)  schedule  intersects  the  horizontal  axis  at 
A(m),  B(m)  A(m) 
B(m) 
m2=m3= ..  /  m  m=m1  mFi0 
FIG. 2.-Iinm,,,o  mn'(m)  0  ( SPECULATIVE  HYPERINFLATIONS  681 
in- >  0,  where  v'(tii)  =  u'(Y).  Because  z( )  is  strictly concave,  A(ml) is 
positive and increasing  f'or in >  WIt,  and A(ni) is negative  for () <  nt <  iti. 
Since  0  <  1, A(ni)  and  B(mt)  intersect  at  some  Tn >  itb. This  positive 
steady-state  level  of' real  balances  itb can  be  shown  to  be  unique.-) 
Whether  the  two schedules  also  intersect  at in  =  (=  epends  on  the 
shape  of  v(-)  for  in <  iii.  If' lim,,,)  A(in)  -  liim,,,  Mlw'(in)  <  0,  we 
have  the  configuration  of' figure  1.  If  instead  lil,,,()  1inz'(1ti)  =  0, 
we have  that of  figure  2.1' 
In figure  1 we illustrate a time path of' real balances {Itno, in  i,  l.  ..} 
originating  at tit( >  tln.  Such paths are explosive  and may be ruled out 
because  they  violate  a  necessary  transversality  condition.  Iterating 
equation  (4) forward,  we obtain  its multiperiod  analogue, 
T-  I 
u  (C,)/Pt  =  A  [  (in,?)/P,,]  +  [Lo'(,?+T)/P1+T].  (10) 
.. =  O) 
By  taking  the  limit  of' (10)  as  T  x,  one  sees  the  necessity  of' the 
transversality  condition  limTX  [  U'(?  +  T)/P? +  T] =  0. This  condition 
ensures  that  an  individual  cannot  raise  his  welfare  by permanently 
reducing  his nominal  balances by $1.00.  (See also Brock  1975.) While 
explosive  real balance  paths originating  above Th  violate the trallsver- 
sality condition,  the steady-state  Euler path, in, =  ib for all t, does not. 
Because the steady-state  path is also feasible, it is therefore  an equilib- 
rium  path. 
Consider  next  paths originating  at in() <  -R.  Along  these speculative 
hyperinflationary  paths,  real balances decline  over time even  though 
the  nominal  money  stock  is  constant.  We  now  argue  that  all  such 
paths  may  be  ruled  out  as  equilibria  if', and  only  if', the  following 
iinfeasibility condition  holds: 
lim  nAl'(n)  >  0.  (11) 
The  argument  is as follows.  First, return to figure  1, which is drawn 
on the assumption  that (1 1) does  hold.  By inspection,  any solution  to 
(6)  initiated  by  tn1) <  'i  requires  that  in, eventually  become  negative. 
These  paths are infeasible  and  may therefore  be excluded  from  the 
class of' possible  equilibrium  paths.  It  follows  that  when  (11)  is as- 
sumed,  the  steady-state  path  is the  unique  equilibrium  path. 
When nin'(ni)  ->  0 as in ->  0, as in figure 2, most Euler paths starting 
' Clearly, B(ti)  > A(mi) =  0. Because  <"(m) <  0 and lim,,,  v'(m)  =  O,  A (m) and B(rn) 
intersect at least once  at some m >  Th.  Uniqueness  of Tm  is an immediate  consequence  of 
the  strict concavity  of  v( ). 
If,  - lim,,  mzn'(n)  =  - x,  e.g.,  when  A(m)  =  mI -RI1  -  R)  and  R  >  1, the  Ar(m) 
schedule  cuts the vertical axis only  at  -  x. 
l  As mr,  -x  o,  Euler-path  eq.  (6) becomes,  approximately,  m,  I =  mn/r. Eventually, 
therefore,  the  price level  falls at rate P. 68  2  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
to the left of' Ti are again infeasible.  However,  Euler paths which pass 
through  tit, such  as the  one  depicted  in figure  2,  are not  infeasible: 
While the price level becomes  and remains infinite after a finite num- 
ber of' periods,'2  real  balances need  not become  negative to generate  a 
path satisfying  (6). 
'To show  that  these  speculative  hyperinflationary  Euler  paths  are 
equilibrium  paths, we must answer two questions.  First, why do agents 
hold positive  real balances at any time if'  they expect  the price level to 
become  and  remain  infinite  after  a finite  number  of' periods?  The 
reason is that tit, the equilibrium  real money stock in the period before 
the  price  level  becomes  infinite,  satisfies v'(M) =  u'(y).  Thus,  agents 
are content  to hold th >  () without attempting  to increase consumption 
above T. The  utility gained  by consuming  a dollar just equals that lost 
through  the concomitant  reduction  in real balances. The  individual  is 
not concerned  that his dollars  will be worthless  next  period."'- 
The  second  question  relates to the assumption  v'(0)  =c.  Since the 
marginal  utility of  money  grows  without  bound  as m -  0, will it not 
pay  for  the  individual  at  some  point  to  "consume  a  little  less  and 
harvest  a large  marginal  utility  from  money  services"?"' To  answer 
this, we consider  the  transversality  argument:  Suppose  that an indi- 
vidual permanently  adds a dollar to his money holdings  at some time t 
before  the  price  level jumps  to  infinity.  If  the  price  level  becomes 
infinite  at time  t  +  L, then  v'(m,+z_  1) =  v'(mh) =  u'(y);  and  by setting 
T  =  L  -  1 in  (1(0) and  assuming  equilibrium  we  obtain 
u'y/t=  E  [13v'v(m,?.3/P,+j.  (12) 
..  =  (1 
The  gain from  holding  an extra dollar forever  when  it is known  that 
money  will lose  its purchasing  power  at time t +  L is given  by 
E [[3-v  (M,+,/,+]+  lim{j  [13  tY(M/P)/P]}.  (13) 
Ns  P--  ()  Se  ==EI, 
12  Strictly speaking,  the  derivation  of  first-order  conditions  in the  previous  section 
assumed  finite prices. We therefore  proceed  from first principles  in arguing  below that 
paths along which m -(  0 in finite time can be equilibrium  paths. It is worth noting  that 
when  lim,,,1  v'(m) <  u'(y) (contrary to the assumption  in the text), the A(m) schedule 
does  not  intersect  the  horizontal  axis  but  is always  above  it.  In  this  case,  any  path 
originating  to the left of mi  is an equilibrium  path (provided  -m  >  0). Along  such paths, 
the  price level  approaches  infinity  asymptotically. 
'.  The  possibility  of  speculative  hyperinflationary  paths  in  this  pure  fiat  money 
model does  not disappear  when agents' lives are finite. If lim,,,ed1  tnv'(m) =  0 and agents 
choose  an initial real balance level that leads them to hold real balances mi  at some point 
before  their  lives end,  the  price level  will still become  infinite  in the next  period. 
"4  Brock (1975,  p.  138) uses this argument  to rule out hyperinflationary  equilibrium 
paths. SPECULATIVE  HYPERINFLATIONS  68A 
When limm >eo  mv'(m) =  0, expression  (13) equals the right-hand  side 
of (12), and so the gain from holding  an additional  dollar foreverjust 
equals the  utility forgone  to obtain  the  dollar at time t. 
Of course, if limmbo  mv'(m) >  0, then the limit in (13) is positive and 
(13) therefore  exceeds  the  right-hand  side of  (12).  In this case, each 
individual  would  try  to  permanently  increase  his  nominal  money 
holdings  along  implosive  real balance  paths,  but he  would  do  so be- 
cause  the  infeasibility  condition  (11)  implies  that  money  has  intrin- 
sic  value  for  him  even  when  the  price  level  is  infinite.  Evidently, 
the  infeasibility  condition  ( 11),  which  is  necessary  for  price-level 
uniqueness  in this model,  places a very severe restriction on the utility 
function  v(Q).  The  severity  of  this restriction  is illustrated  by the  fol- 
lowing: 
THEOREM:  If  limmng) mv'(m) >  0, then  lim,,()  v(m)  -  -x. 
PROOF: Because  v'(m)  >  0, limno() v(m)  -a  exists  but  may equal 
-  x.* Suppose  (contrary to the assertion of the theorem)  that a is finite. 
If limmbo mv'(m) >  0, there  exists a positive  number  b and a level of 
real  balances  m* such  that  mv'(m)  -  b for  all m  <  m*. The  strict 
concavity of v(Q)  implies that, for m <  m*, v(m)  -  a >  mv'(m) :  b. But 
if a is finite, m can be chosen  small enough  so that m <  m* and v(m)  - 
a <  b; and this contradicts  the foregoing  string of inequalities.  There- 
fore, a  =  limm-  o v(m) =  -0. 
The  theorem  shows  how  important  money  must be if speculative 
hyperinflationary  equilibria are to be excluded  under a pure fiat mon- 
etary system.  It must  be true  that if an agent  is deprived  of  his real 
balances,  no  finite  increase  in  his  endowment  of  the  consumption 
good  can restore  him to his previous  utility level.'5  This requirement 
seems inconsistent  with the view that the utility-of-money  function  v(Q) 
captures  money's  role  in  reducing  the  frictions  that  would  charac- 
terize a complex  barter economy.16 
15  Note,  however,  that the converse  of the theorem  is tiot true. Thus,  the assumption 
lim,',(  v(m)  =  -x  is  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  to  preclude  speculative  hy- 
perinflationary  equilibria.  A concave  function  v(y) such  that v(m)  =  [log  (r)]113 for m 
S  exp (-_  '2/3)  has the property  that lim,,-(  v(m)  =  -  b  hut also satisfies lim,,i11  mv (m) 
=  0.  Note,  however,  that  if  v'(0)  =  -x  and  P  *x  in  finite  time,  the  individual's 
maximization  problem  has  no  solution.  The  interpretation  of  hyperinflationary  (but 
feasible)  Euler paths becomes  problematic  in this case. 
16 Brock  (1974)  contains  a brief  discussion  of  the  money-in-the-utility-function  ap- 
proach. He shows that the latter is equivalent  to assuming  that each agent derives utility 
from consumption  and leisure,  where  leisure  is an increasing  function  of real balances 
because  money  saves transactions  time.  However,  that story does  not provide  a plaus- 
ible  rationalization  for  the  infeasibility  condition  (11).  While  it may be  reasonable  to 
assume  that  utility  is infinitely  negative  when  leisure  is zero,  it is not  reasonable  to 
assume  that an agent  who does  not hold  money  will have no leisure  time. Gray (1982) 
specifies  a somewhat  different  role  for money,  one  in which  real balances  reduce  the 
output  cost of  transactions  rather  than  their  cost  in  terms  of' leisure.  The  condition 
necessary  for  uniqueness  of  equilibrium  in Gray's model  is formally  identical  to (11), 684  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
III.  The  Uniqueness  of  Equilibrium  under  Fractional  Backing 
The  previous  sections  have assumed  a pure fiat monetary  system and 
ignored  the  possibility  that  the  government  might  back  money  by 
standing  ready to redeem  each dollar for a specified  amount  of some 
real asset. This  section  shows that government  backing can eliminate 
speculative  hyperinflationary  equilibria, even  if that backing is uncer- 
tain and  arbitrarily small. 
Consider  initially a monetary  regime  under  which the government 
promises  to redeem  each dollar bill for E units of capital but does  not 
offer  to sell money  for capital.'7  Because  the price of capital in terms 
of consumption  must equal its steady-state  value q in equilibrium,  the 
government's  promise  in effect  guarantees  that $1.00  can always buy 
at least eq  units  of  consumption.  It is assumed  that E is chosen  to be 
sufficiently  small that  lEqE >  P, where P is the steady-state  price level. 
The  official backing is thus fractional in the sense that the real output 
obtained by returning  $1.00  to the government  is less than what could 
be obtained  by selling the dollar on the market in steady-state equilib- 
rium. 
Feasibility of the government's  policy requires that the government 
have  access  to  sufficient  reserves  of  capital  to  purchase  the  entire 
money  stock M at the  support  price  E.  Otherwise,  speculative  infla- 
tionary  paths  involving  a sudden  run  on  the  government's  reserves 
cannot  be  excluded.'8  The  government's  reserve  stock  naturally  in- 
cludes  at least the  physical capital it owns  (kg).' ) 
To see how a feasible fractional backing arrangement  can eliminate 
speculative  hyperinflationary  paths, it is convenient  to assume that E is 
chosen  sufficiently  small  that P  /lEq >  P,  that  is, so that u'(y)  - 
II'(M/P)  <  ()  With fractional backing the aggregate  nominal  money 
stock is endogenous,  for  it may f  all at a point  in time  should  agents 
except  that a transactions function  replaces the utility-of-money  function.  The  theorem 
of  this section  can be used  to prove  that Gray's uniqueness  condition  holds  only when 
transaction costs eat up more than  100 percent  of output  in the absence of money.  It is 
therefore  impossible  to rule out speculative  hyperinflations  when the demand  for pure 
fiat money  arises from  Gray's transactions  technology. 
17  The  asset used to back the currency may be thought  of as "gold" that appreciates  in 
real terms  at a fixed  exogenous  rate r. We  analyze  capital  backing  rather  than  gold 
backing  here  in  order  to  avoid  modeling  the  role  of  gold  in  consumption  and/or 
production.  But  our  results  would  clearly carry over  to a model  in which  currency  is 
redeemable  in terms of  gold. 
18 Salant (1983)  studies  how runs can occur under  government  price-fixing  schemes 
and provides  references  to related literature.  Note  that while runs may occur if backing 
is insufficient,  they do  not occur  of  necessity  in the  present  context. 
19  The  government's  potential  reserves are larger if it can issue bonds that are perfect 
substitutes  for capital, financing  interest  payments  through  taxation. 
2()  This  assumption  is made  solely  for  expository  purposes;  higher  values  of  e  will 
prevent  speculative  hyperinflations  provided  the government  has the resources  to buy 
back the  money  supply  at the quoted  price. SPECULATIVE  IHYPERINFLATIONS  685 
decide  to trade  in their  money.  An  equilibrium  price-level  path  for 
real balances must still be governed  by (4). Equation (14) below is the 
same as (4) except  that we have substituted  the equilibrium  condition 
Ct -  C/  + I  =-  By: 
[U'(y)  -  v'(M,/P,)]/P,  =  Mu'(y)/P,+l  (14) 
Note,  however,  that P, can never exceed  P, for an arbitrage opportu- 
nity inconsistent  with equilibrium  would  exist if the  nominal  market 
price of' capital,  P,7,  were  to  exceed  the  government's  selling  price, 
Pq  =  l/E. Obviously,  no money  is ever turned  in for capital while P, < 
P. The  steady-state  path of the pure  fiat money  economy,  with M,  = 
M  and P,  -  P  for all t, remains an equilibrium path under  our  new 
assumptions.  But  it is easy  to  see  that  speculative  hyperinflationary 
paths can now be ruled  out even  if lim,1()  MV'(m)  =  0. Suppose  that 
{P.} is an equilibrium  path  with P() >  P.  Let PT  =  max  {PJPI  <  P}. 
By  (14),  PT  must  be  below  P,  so  that  u'(y)  -  v'(MIPT)  >  0,  while 
PT+ I must exceed  PT  and therefore  equal F.  But there is no MT+  I 
M  such  that u'(y)  -  v'(MT+  I  1P)  -  0.  Thus,  there  is no  price  level 
PT+2  satisfying  (14) and {P.} is not an equilibrium  path. 
The  government's  intervention  need  not be certain as we have as- 
sumed.  Even the possibility  of intervention  suffices to rule out specula- 
tive paths. Assume  now that in any period  the government  sells capi- 
tal for money  at nominal  price  l/E with a probability -T that does  not 
depend  on what has occurred  in previous  periods.  Let PO >  P be the 
initial price level of some  Euler path. Agents  now maximize  expected 
utility, but as long as P lies below P, the path of the economy  does  not 
depend  on the realization of the government's  coin flip. Again, let PT 
be the highest  price level on that path below P.  In  period T  +  1, the 
price level equals P (with probability ST)  or PT? 1  P (with probability 
1 -  iT); thus [u'(y)  -  v'(MIPT)]IPT  =  fU'(Y){(Ir/P)  +  [(1  -  1r)IPT+  III} 
Regardless  of the outcome,  u'(y)  -  V'(MT+  l)  <  0, so that there  is no 
distribution  of' the  price  level  for  period  T  +  2  consistent  with 
equilibrium. 
The  backing  schemes  we have been  considering  preclude  specula- 
tive hyperinflations  even  though  the government  need  never actually 
execute  the exchange  it offers  to make. The  government  is thus able 
to guarantee  that the economy  follows  the steady-state  path. Because 
consumption  is the same  along  all paths but real balances are higher 
on  the  steady-state  path  than  on  any  speculative  hyperinflationary 
path,  a backing  scheme  may  also  guarantee  that  all individuals  are 
better  off.21 
21 Strictly speaking,  the analysis presented  here does not permit us to conclude  that a 
system of  fractional  backing  is definitely  Pareto superior  to a pure  fiat money  regime 686  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
IV.  Conclusions 
This  paper  has  used  an  infinite-horizon  monetary  model  based  on 
individual  maximizing  behavior  to study  whether  divergent  specula- 
tive price-level  paths can be equilibrium  paths under  rational expecta- 
tions.  The  model  confirms  the  standard  results  that  explosive  and 
implosive  paths for capital asset prices and implosive  price-level  paths 
are inconsistent  with equilibrium.  Under  a regime of' pure fiat money, 
however,  explosive  price-level  paths-speculative  hyperinflations- 
can be ruled  out only when  severe  restrictions  are placed on individ- 
ual  preferences.  In  particular,  agents  must  have  infinitely  negative 
utility when  their  real balances  are  zero.  The  theorem  yielding  this 
conclusion  can be applied  to similarly interpret  the conditions  needed 
to preclude  speculative  hyperinflations  in other  models  of' pure  fiat 
money. 
If' the government  fractionally  backs the currency  by guaranteeing 
a minimal real redemption  value for money,  the problem  of specula- 
tive hyperinflation  disappears.  Even  though  the  government  need 
never exercise  its redemption  guarantee,  hyperinflationary  equilibria, 
in which  the  welfare  of  all is lower  than  in the  steady-state  equilib- 
riumi, are eliminated.  As Brock  (1982b)  has conjectured,  speculative 
hyperinflations  can  be  ruled  out  even  if  agents  are  not  completely 
certain  that they can redeem  their  money  in any given  period. 
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